Abstract. We give a general method for constructing a deterministic strategy of Reality from a randomized strategy in game-theoretic probability. The construction can be seen as derandomization in game-theoretic probability.
1. Introduction 1.1. Reality's strategy in Game-theoretic probability. Game-theoretic probability [18] is a probability theory based on a betting game between two players, Skeptic and Reality. Sometimes we add the third player called Forecaster. In gametheoretic probability an almost sure event is (usually) formalized as an event such that Skeptic can increase his capital to infinity if the event does not happen. In this case we say that Skeptic has a winning strategy. In game-theoretic probability, in order to prove that an event happens almost surely, we construct a winning strategy of Skeptic. A number of such strategies have been constructed so far. Often these strategies of Skeptic correspond to well-known proofs in measure-theoretic probability that a certain event happens with probability one.
In this paper, when we just refer to a strategy, it is a deterministic strategy. We explicitly say "randomized strategy", when a strategy utilizes random variables in the sense of measure-theoretic probability.
There is no counterpart of Reality's strategy in measure-theoretic probability, because in measure-theoretic probability Reality is simply generating random variables under a given probability distribution without any specific strategy. Hence it is more difficult to derive results on Reality's strategies. Reality's strategies correspond to the notion of derandomization, since if Reality is following a strategy she is not random in the measure-theoretic sense.
If a two-player game (without Forecaster) is with perfect information, then at least one of the players has a winning strategy in the game by Martin's Theorem (Theorem 5.8). If Skeptic does not have a winning strategy, Reality should have. For instance, consider the game-theoretic version of Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers [18, Proposition 4.1] . Shafer and Vovk proved the existence of Reality's winning strategy in Section 4.3 in their book [18] . The proof is, however, nonconstructive. The two main tools of the proof are (i) the randomized strategy for Reality that was devised by Kolmogorov, (ii) Martin's theorem. It is unnatural that we need to use such a big theorem, Martin's theorem, to answer such a simple question. It was a long-standing question to give a concrete deterministic strategy of Reality.
Vovk [20] finally gave such a strategy. The proof is simple, which is a desired property. The proof seems to be based on the randomized strategy by Kolmogorov, but it is not clear how these two strategies are related. Thus it is difficult to know from his proof how to modify the randomized strategy to answer a similar question in different games. On the other hand, Miyabe and Takemura [12] derived a rather strong result on strategies of Reality. The essential idea is that Reality uses a "fictional" strategy of Skeptic. In fact, Theorem 4.12 of Miyabe and Takemura [12] showed the existence of Reality's strategy. However, they did not give a concrete strategy. Thus we did not know how the strategy looks like.
In this paper we construct a concrete strategy of Reality based on the idea above. The construction goes as follows.
(i) Take a randomized strategy of Reality.
(ii) Construct a strategy of Skeptic that forces the random event.
(iii) Construct a strategy of Reality using it. Each step is straightforward and does not require coming up with a new strategy. Since we construct a deterministic strategy from a randomized one, we call this derandomization in game-theoretic probability.
1.2.
Derandomization. Randomized algorithm [13, 11] has been frequently used in complexity theory [7, 1] . One of the reasons is that there are some problems such that it seems difficult to prove that they are polynomial-time computable but they are polynomial-time computable with an random oracle with high probability.
The class BPP (Bounded-error Probabilistic Polynomial-time) is, roughly speaking, the set of problems that are polynomial-time computable with a randomized algorithm. It has been conjectured that every problem in BPP is actually polynomial-time computable, that is, BPP = P. In other words, the conjecture is asking whether we can always derandomize in this setting.
An analogous question in computability theory [3, 15, 16] has been solved. On Cantor space 2 N with the uniform measure µ, if A ∈ 2 N is not computable, then the set of all sequences that compute A has measure 0 [4, 17] . Thus, if a sequence is computable by a randomized strategy, then the sequence should be computable. In other words, we can always derandomize if we do not care about computational resource.
Derandomization asks the question how we can deterministically construct a sequence random enough. Construction of such a sequence has been studied in the theory of algorithmic randomness [5, 14] to separate some randomness notions. The essential idea is diagonalization. One recent interesting application is the construction of an absolutely normal number in polynomial time [10, 6, 2] .
The same technique can be applied to construct a strategy of Reality that complies with an event in game-theoretic probability. Derandomization itself is much easier in this case because we do not care about computability at all. In contrast, we need to consider a sequence of reals in our case while derandomization in complexity theory and the theory of algorithmic randomness usually considers an infinite binary sequence.
1.3. Overview of this paper. The main theme of this paper is the construction of Reality's strategy. In Section 3 we study Borel-Cantelli lemmas in game-theoretic probability. This is a simple case and illustrates how the construction goes. Then, the result will be used in the next section. In Section 4 we give a deterministic strategy of Reality that complies with the success and the failure of the strong law of large numbers. In Section 5 we give a general theory of the notion of compliance and look at some examples.
Preliminaries
In this paper we mainly consider the unbounded forecasting game defined in Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk [18] .
Unbounded Forecasting Game (UFG) Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
Forecaster announces m n ∈ R and v n ≥ 0. Skeptic announces M n ∈ R and V n ≥ 0.
Reality announces x n ∈ R.
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep K n non-negative. Reality must keep K n from tending to infinity.
An infinite sequence ξ = (m 1 , v 1 , x 1 , m 2 , v 2 , x 2 , · · · ) of moves of Forecaster and Reality is called a path. Define the sample space
as the set of paths. Any subset E ⊆ Ω is called an event. We say that a strategy P of Skeptic forces an event E if the capital K P n (ξ) of Skeptic with P is non-negative for all ξ ∈ Ω and for all n ≥ 0, and ξ ∈ E implies lim sup n K P n (ξ) = ∞. Skeptic can force an event if there is a strategy P of Skeptic that forces the event. Note that we are not distinguishing "weak forcing" and "forcing", since they are equivalent ([18, Lemma 3.1]). Definition 2.1 (Miyabe and Takemura [12] ). By a strategy R, Reality complies with an event E ⊆ Ω if (i) ξ ∈ E, irrespective of the moves of Forecaster and Skeptic, with Skeptic observing his collateral duty, (ii) sup n K n < ∞.
Reality strongly complies with E if (ii) is replaced with K n ≤ K 0 for all n. 
(ii) Reality can comply with
We call the event of (i) the success of SLLN (Strong Law of Large Numbers) and the event of (ii) the failure of SLLN. In the proof of (ii), Shafer and Vovk [18, Proposition 4 .1] use a randomized strategy of Reality and Martin's theorem, but did not give a concrete strategy. Vovk [20] gave a concrete strategy. The result also follows from Theorem 4.12 of Miyabe and Takemura [12] .
The following is the key fact to give a strategy of Reality. In the proof of this theorem, a strategy of Reality was constructed using the strategy of Skeptic that forces the event.
Borel-Cantelli lemmas
In this section we focus on game-theoretic versions of Borel-Cantelli lemmas, which will play an important role to give the strategy of Reality that complies with the success and the failure of SLLN in the next section.
Coin-Tossing Game Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {0, 1}.
Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep K n non-negative. Reality must keep K n from tending to infinity. The following result is a game-theoretic version of Lévy's Extension of the BorelCantelli Lemma. 
By essentially the same argument in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we can show that Reality can comply with the event (1). Here we give a concrete strategy. In order to do that, we need a concrete strategy of Skeptic that forces (1) and the simpler the better. Proposition 3.1 follows from the following two lemmas. Lemma 3.2. In the coin-tossing game, Skeptic can force
be the sets of time indices of heads and tails before the round n and let
denote the number of heads before the round n. Note that for any distinct k, j ∈ H n , we have
Consider the following strategy of Skeptic:
We claim that this strategy forces the event.
First, we show that this strategy keeps K n non-negative. Note that
Next, suppose that n p n = ∞ and n x n < ∞. Then, there exists N such that n ≥ N ⇒ x n = 0. Thus, for every n ≥ N ,
Lemma 3.3. In the coin-tossing game, Skeptic can force
Proof. Let c n be the natural number satisfying
Note that
First we show that this strategy keeps K n non-negative. Note that
where T n is defined in (2). Then
Next we show that this strategy forces the event. Assume that n p n < ∞ and
For n ≥ N such that x n = 0, we have
Since n p n < ∞, we have lim sup n K n = ∞.
Using these strategies, Reality can strongly comply with the same event.
Theorem 3.4. In the coin-tossing game, Reality strongly complies with
Proof. Let b n , c n be defined by (3) and (5). We claim that the following strategy of Reality strongly complies with the event:
Reality waits for the first round n 0 such that Skeptic announces M n = 0. If such a round does not exist, let n 0 = ∞. For n < n 0 including the case n 0 = ∞, Reality announces x n as
For n = n 0 , Reality announces x n as
If K n0 = 0, then for n > n 0 Reality announces x n as
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the event. If n 0 = ∞, then clearly n p n < ∞ if and only if n x n < ∞ and K n = K 0 . Then, we can assume that n 0 < ∞.
, then Skeptic should announce M n = 0 for every n > n 0 in order to keep K n non-negative. Thus, K n = 0 for every n > n 0 . In this case clearly n p n < ∞ if and only if n x n < ∞.
In what follows, we assume K n0 > 0. Then 0 < ǫ < 1. Suppose that n p n = ∞ and n x n < ∞. Since b n is bounded and c n goes to infinity, there exists δ such that d n > δ and x n = 0 for all sufficiently large n > N . Then for such an n, we have
as n → ∞. Thus, such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed.
Suppose that n p n < ∞ and n x n = ∞. Since c n is bounded, b n goes to infinity and p n goes to 0, there exists δ > 0 such that d n < −δ and p n ≤ 1/2 for all sufficiently large n > N . For n > N such that x n = 1,
For n > N such that x n = 0,
Thus, K n → −∞ and such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed. Finally we show that sup n K n ≤ 1. Since we have
For n ≥ n 0 such that x n = 1, we have
For n ≥ n 0 such that x n = 0, we have
By (4) and (6), we have
From now on we explain how we derived the above strategy. The goal is to construct a strategy of Reality that complies with the event E of n p n < ∞ ⇐⇒ n x n < ∞. It suffices to give a strategy with which Reality's move is "random" in the following two senses:
(a) The capital is finite.
(b) The path satisfies the almost-sure property E. The meaning of randomness in measure-theoretic probability is not clear. In the theory of algorithmic randomness, one formulation of randomness is finiteness of the capital for all betting strategies that are effective in some sense. In game-theoretic probability, randomness of a path means the finiteness of the capital in the game. For instance, Vovk and Shen [21] have used the terminology of "game-random". With this view, we express the property (b) by the finiteness of the capital with respect to the strategy with which Skeptic can force the event E.
By the proof of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, the following strategy F of Skeptic forces the event E:
Reality uses this strategy F as a fictional strategy. We denote by S the real strategy of Skeptic. In order to comply with the event E, all Reality has to do is to make the capital with the strategy (S + F )/2 finite. Note that the finiteness of the capital with (S + F )/2 implies the finiteness of the capital with S and the capital with F . Furthermore, the finiteness of the capital with F implies the event E because F forces the event E. The strategy O = (S + F )/2 announces
by announcing
Then this strategy complies with the event E. Notice that this strategy gives the essential part of the strategy in the proof of Theorem 3.4. To give a strategy that "strongly" complies with the event, we need a little trick. The idea is taken from the proof of Proposition 4.10 in [12] . A rough idea is as follows. Wait until the round n 0 satisfying M n0 = 0 so that Reality can make the capital strictly less than the initial capital. Let 1 − ǫ be the ratio of the capital at n 0 and the initial capital. After the round n 0 , Reality only has to make the capital with (1 − ǫ)S + ǫF non-increasing. The derived strategy is the strategy in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Derandomization in the Unbounded Forecasting Game and its generalization
In this section we give Reality's strategies complying with the success and the failure of the strong law of large numbers at the same time in the Unbounded Forecasting Game and its generalization.
4.1.
A strategy of Reality for the Unbounded Forecasting Game. Theorem 4.1. In the unbounded forecasting game, Reality strongly complies with
Note that this theorem implies (ii) of Theorem 2.2. We show this by giving a concrete strategy of Reality.
In measure-theoretic probability, the failure of SLLN was shown by the following randomized strategy devised by Kolmogorov [8] : if v n < n 2 ,
Here, to show the non-convergence, the second part of the Borel-Cantelli lemmas is used. In contrast, if n v n /n 2 < ∞, then by the first part of the Borel-Cantelli lemma, SLLN holds almost surely.
Motivated by this strategy we restrict x n ∈ {0, ±n} if v n < n 2 , and
Then, the strategy we need to construct is the one of Reality that complies with n v n n 2 < ∞ ⇐⇒ x n = 0 for all but finitely many n.
Recall that we can construct a strategy of Reality if we have a strategy of Skeptic that forces the event. Such a strategy of Skeptic can be constructed by modifying the strategy constructed in the previous section.
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that m n = 0 for every n. Furthermore, we can forget the round n such that v n = 0 by letting x n = 0. Thus, we assume that v n > 0 for every n.
Proof. We claim that the following strategy of Reality strongly complies with the event:
and c n be the natural number satisfying
Reality waits for the first round n 0 such that Skeptic announces (M n , V n ) = (0, 0). If such a round does not exist, let n 0 = ∞. For n < n 0 including the case n 0 = ∞, Reality announces x n as
For n > n 0 Reality announces x n as
where
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the event. If n 0 = ∞, then clearly n v n /n 2 < ∞ if and only if x n = 0 for all but finitely many n, and K n = K 0 for every n. Then, we can assume that n 0 < ∞.
Consider the round n = n 0 . If V n = 0, then
Thus, K n0 < K 0 . If K n0 = 0, then Skeptic should announce (M n , V n ) = (0, 0) for every n > n 0 in order to keep K n non-negative. Thus, K n = 0 for every n > n 0 . In this case clearly n v n /n 2 < ∞ if and only if x n = 0 for all but finitely many n. In what follows we assume K n0 > 0. Then 0 < ǫ < 1. Suppose that n v n /n 2 = ∞ and x n = 0 for all but finitely many n. Since b n is bounded and c n goes to infinity, there exists δ such that d n > δ/n 2 for all sufficiently large n > N 0 . Then, for such an n,
as n → ∞. Thus, such a strategy of Skeptic is not allowed. Suppose that n v n /n 2 < ∞ and x n = 0 for infinitely many n. Since c n is bounded and b n goes to infinity, d n is negative for all sufficiently large n. Since n v n /n 2 < ∞, we have v n < n 2 for all sufficiently large n. Thus, x n should be 0 for all sufficiently large n. This is a contradiction.
Finally we show that sup n K n ≤ 1. It suffices to show that K n ≤ K n0 + ǫKn 0 1−ǫ . For n ≥ n 0 such that x n = 0, we have
4.2.
A strategy of Reality in a generalization of the Unbounded Forecasting Game. There are some possible ways in which we generalize our result for the Unbounded Forecasting Game. Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi [9] have obtained similar results in a game which generalizes the Unbounded Forecasting Game. Miyabe and Takemura [12] have shown the existence of the strategy that strongly complies with the failure of SLLN in a rather general setting. Here, we give a stronger result in the general setting in the following senses.
(i) We give a concrete deterministic strategy.
(ii) The strategy strongly complies with the success and the failure of SLLN at the same time. (iii) We use weaker assumptions. (iv) The strategy is much simpler. The following protocol is from Section 5 in Miyabe and Takemura [12] .
Unbounded Forecasting Game with General Hedge (UFGH) Parameters: A single hedge h : R → R Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
Forecaster announces m n ∈ R and v n ≥ 0. Skeptic announces M n ∈ R and V n ≥ 0. Reality announces x n ∈ R.
Here, we are taking into account Remark 5.3 of [12] .
Theorem 4.2 (Theorem 5.9 in [12]). Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A3) and that
g is a positive increasing function. Then in UFGH, Reality strongly complies with
does not converge. 
We consider a slightly weaker condition, but the following assumption is cricital to show the strong compliance. See Remark 4.7 for details. Assumption (A4) h(0) = 0. From now on we show the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that h satisfies (A0)-(A2), (A4) and that g is a positive increasing function. Then in UFGH, Reality strongly complies with
Note that Theorem 4.4 implies the two theorems above. Theorem 4.4 also implies Proposition 2.1 in [9] by letting m n = 0, v n = v, h(x) = x r and g(x) = x/v. Furthermore, Theorem 4.4 also implies Proposition 3.1 in [9] by letting m n = 0, v n = v and g(x) = h(vx).
Before giving the strategy, we recall the following lemma. (i) ǫ n is determined only by a 1 , · · · , a n , (ii) ǫ n a n ≤ 1, (iii) n a n = ∞ implies n ǫ n a n = ∞ and ǫ n → 0.
Furthermore, by the proof, we can assume that (iv) n a n < ∞ implies that {ǫ n } converges to a positive real. Now we are ready to give the strategy. In UFGH, we consider the following strategy of Reality:
where {ǫ n } is the sequence determined by Lemma 4.5 for {v n /g(A n )}. Reality waits for the first round n 0 such that Skeptic announces (M n , V n ) = (0, 0). If such a round does not exist, n 0 = ∞. For n < n 0 including the case n 0 = ∞, Reality announces x n as
n ). For n = n 0 , Reality announces x n as
. If K n0 = 0, then for n > n 0 Reality announces x n as
We show that this strategy strongly complies with the success and the failure of SLLN at the same time. In the proof we use the following lemma. Lemma 4.6 (Miyabe and Takemura [12, Lemma 4.14] ). Let {y n } be a sequence of reals and let {g n } be a non-decreasing sequence of positive reals. If ( k≤n y k )/g n converges to d, then |y n /g n | ≤ |d| + 1 for all but finitely many n.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By a similar argument as the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that Reality can comply with
< ∞ ⇐⇒ x n = 0 for all but finitely many n except the following two places. (1) The capital of the case such that n v n /g(A n ) = ∞ and x n = 0 for all but finitely many n is as follows:
(2) For n ≥ n 0 such that x n = 0, we have
From now on, we show that x n = 0 for all but finitely many n if and only if
Suppose that x n = 0 for all but finitely many n and lim n A n < ∞. Then, n x n converges and h
Suppose that x n = 0 for all but finitely many n and lim n A n = ∞. Then, n x n converges and lim n h
Suppose that x n = 0 for infinitely many n. This means that
n ) by the monotonicity of h. Thus,
for infinitely many n. We claim that the right-hand side goes to infinity. Then, by Lemma 4.6,
Since ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞, we have
for all sufficiently large n. Since h is non-decreasing, so is h −1 and
Remark 4.7. Notice that Assumption (A4) is used to show that K n0 < K 0 . At the round n = n 0 , if V n > 0, then x n = 0 and
which is negative because h(0) = 0.
On the notion of Compliance
In this section we give a general theory on compliance. We consider the unbounded forecasting game or the coin-tossing game, but most theorems can be applied to a similar game.
5.1.
The strength of compliance. Recall Theorem 2.3, which says that Reality strongly complies with the event that Skeptic can force. An interpretation of this fact in the usual notion of probability is like this:
For each event with probability 1, one can deterministically take a path in the event. Clearly, the probability of the event is closely related to the supremum of the capital of Skeptic. The strongness of the compliance seems to be due to probability 1 of the event. With this motivation we study the relation between the notion of compliance and the upper and lower probability.
We denote strategies of Forecaster, Skeptic and Reality by F , S and R respectively.
Definition 5.1 (Shafer and Vovk [18, Chapter 8.3] ). The upper probability of an event E is defined as
where S needs to keep the capital non-negative. The lower probability is defined as
The following are some properties of P and P .
Proposition 5.2 (see [18, Proposition 8.12] ). Skeptic can force an event E if and only if P (E) = 1.
The "only if" direction holds because the convex combination of strategies of Skeptic is possible in the game. Proposition 5.3 (see [18, Proposition 8.10] ). The upper probability P is an outer measure and the lower probability P is an inner measure.
Proposition 5.4 (see [19, Lemma 1] ). For every event E, we have
We define a similar function based on the notion of compliance.
Definition 5.5. For an event E, let
The following are immediate by definition.
Proposition 5.6. If Reality strongly complies with E, then Q(E) = 1.
Proposition 5.7. If Q(E) > 0, then Reality complies with E.
A two-player game is called determined if one of the player has a winning strategy.
Theorem 5.8 (Martin's theorem; see [18, Chapter 4.6] ). If the winning condition is Borel, then the game is determined.
Remark 5.9. In fact, Martin's theorem says that quasi-Borel is enough.
If Forecaster does not exist, then the game is with perfect information. Then, by Martin's theorem, we can show that Q is equal to P in this case.
Theorem 5.10. Suppose that Forecaster's strategy is fixed in advance and Borel. If E is Borel, then P (E) = Q(E) and P (E) = Q(E).
Proof. Suppose the game whose winning condition C a of Skeptic is
This condition can be written as
where A is K 0 = a and B n,m is K n ≥ 1 − 2 −m . Note that A and B n,m are Borel. Recall that the class of Borel sets is closed under countable union, countable intersection and complement. Thus, the condition is Borel for each a.
Suppose P (E) = x > 0, and let ǫ be a positive real small enough. If K 0 = x − ǫ, then no strategy S can guarantee to win. Then Reality has a winning strategy by Martin's theorem. It follows that Q(E) ≥ x = P (E).
Suppose P (E) = 0. Then for each x > 0 there exists a strategy S such that K 0 < x/2 and E ⇒ sup n K n ≥ 1. Thus, the strategy 2S forces K 0 < x and E ⇒ sup n K n > 1. This means that no Reality's strategy complies with K 0 < x and E ⇒ sup n K n ≤ 1. Hence, Q(E) ≤ x. Since x is arbitrary, we have Q(E) = 0. Since E is Borel, then so is E c . Note that P (E c ) = Q(E c ). Then P (E) = Q(E). Theorem 2.3 says that, in our terminology,
By a little modification, we can show the following.
Proposition 5.11.
P (E) ≤ Q(E) and Q(E) ≤ P (E).
Proof. We can assume P (E) = x > 0. Then P (E c ) = 1 − x. Hence there exists S such that K Corollary 5.12. If P (E) > 0, then Reality can comply with E.
5.2. Examples.
5.2.1.
Coin-tossing game. In the following we look at some examples. Some examples show the difference between P and Q.
Example 5.13. In the coin-tossing game, we have Q(
Proof. We show that Q(x 1 = 1) = 0. Consider the following strategy of Forecaster and Skeptic;
If x 1 = 0, then
If x 1 = 1, then
Then this strategy satisfies the collateral duty. This fact means that no strategy of Reality complies with
We can show that Q(x 1 = 0) = 0 in a similar way.
Corollary 5.14. The function Q is not an outer measure in general and Q is not an inner measure in general.
Proof. In the coin-tossing game, let A = {x 1 = 0} and B = {x 1 = 1}. Then, Q(A) = Q(B) = 0 and Q(A∪B) = 1. Thus, the inequality Q(A∪B) ≤ Q(A)+Q(B) does not hold even if A and B are disjoint.
Recall that, in the coin-tossing game, we can assume that Skeptic announces N n ∈ R and V n ≥ 0 and Recall the game-theoretic version of Lévy's extension of the Borel-Cantelli lemmas (Proposition 3.1). In the following, we focus on the case n p n < ∞ and study the distribution of n x n .
Example 5.15. In the coin-tossing game, consider the event E c,k of
Remark 5.16. This is Chebyshev's inequality.
Proof. Let
Then T n is a capital process because
Consider the strategy with
Then, Proof. Reality's strategy is just to announce x n = 0 for every n. Consider a strategy of Skeptic. Since Skeptic should keep K n non-negative,
Then,
If n p n < ∞, then n (1 − p n ) converges to a positive real. Thus, sup n K n < ∞. Hence, Reality can comply with this event. Suppose Q(E) > 0 for a contradiction. Reality should announce x n = 0 for every n. Consider the strategy such that 0 < K 0 < Q(E) and M n = − K n−1 1 − p n .
Then, K n keeps non-negative. Let m ∈ N be such that K 0 2 m > 1. Forecaster announces p n = 1/2 for each n ≤ m and p n = 2 −n for each n > m. Then n p n < ∞. However,
Bounded forecasting game.
Bounded Forecasting Game Players: Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality Protocol:
Forecaster announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Skeptic announces M n ∈ R.
Reality announces x n ∈ [0, 1]. K n := K n−1 + M n (x n − p n ). Collateral Duties: Skeptic must keep K n non-negative. Reality must keep K n from tending to infinity. Proof. First we show that Q(x 1 ∈ [1/2, 1]) = 1. Reality announces x 1 as follows:
If M 1 < 0, then
If M 1 ≥ 0, then
Reality announces x n = 1/2 for all n ≥ 2. Then, this strategy of Reality strongly complies with this event.
Next we show that Q(x 1 ∈ [0, 1/2)) = 1. Let ǫ > 0. It suffices to give a strategy of Reality that satisfies the following condition: if K 0 = 1 − ǫ then x 1 ∈ [0, 1/2) and sup n K n ≤ 1.
We claim that the following strategy works: Reality announces
if M 1 ≥ 0, and x n = 1/2 for all n ≥ 2. First notice that, if K 0 = 1 − ǫ, then (1 − ǫ)/2 ∈ [0, 1/2). We claim that sup n ≤ 1. It suffices to show that K 1 ≤ 1. If M 1 ≥ 0, then
Suppose that M 1 < 0. Since Skeptic needs to keep K 1 non-negative, we have
which implies M 1 ≥ −2(1 − ǫ) > −2. Then,
Corollary 5.19. The function Q is not an inner measure in general and Q is not an outer measure in general.
Corollary 5.20. There is a game and an event E in it such that Q(E) = 1 but Reality can not strongly comply with E.
Proof. Consider the event E of x 1 ∈ [0, 1/2) in the bounded forecasting game with p n = 1/2 for all n. Then Q(E) = 1 as is shown above. Suppose that Skeptic announces M 1 = −1 with K 0 = 1. This move keeps K 1 non-negative. Since x 1 ∈ [0, 1/2), K 1 = 1 − 1(x 1 − 1/2) > 1. Hence, Reality can not strongly comply with this event.
Corollary 5.21. We do not have Q(E) ≤ Q(E) or Q(E) ≥ Q(E) in general.
Proof. In the bounded forecasting game with p n ∈ (0, 1) for all n, consider the event E that x n = p n for infinitely many n. Reality can strongly comply with this event E by announcing x n = p n for every n, thus Q(E) = 1. On the other hand Reality can also strongly complies with E c by announcing
thus Q(E c ) = 1 and Q(E) = 0. In the coin-tossing game, consider the event F that x n = 1 for at most finitely many n. When n p n = ∞, Skeptic can force the event F c . Thus, Q(F ) = 0. When n p n < ∞, Skeptic can force the event F . Thus, Q(F c ) = 0 and Q(F ) = 1.
